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ENFORCEMENT OF ANTITRUST PROSCRIPTIONS AGAINST PRICE Dis-
CRIMINATION AND PRICE CUTTING BY CHAIN STORES-THE
A & P CASE
On November 1, 1955, the Antitrust Division of the Department of
Justice filed a civil antitrust suit and a criminal information against Safe-
way Stores, Incorporated, charging them with violation of the Sherman
and Robinson-Patman Acts.' The complaint and the information allege
that Safeway has attempted to monopolize the retail grocery business in
certain cities in Texas and New Mexico by establishing arbitrary sales
quotas for each of its stores in these areas. They charge that Safeway has
sought to achieve these quotas, amounting to from twenty-five to fifty per
cent of the total retail grocery business of the areas, by selling below in-
voice costs to destroy competition and that Safeway has recouped the losses
thereby incurred, by the sale of identical items at higher prices in stores in
the same area where competition was less severe.2 The civil complaint prays
for an injunction against the continuance of these practices.'
The progress of this litigation will be followed with intense interest
both by chain grocers and by their opponents, for it reopens a highly con-
troversial phase of antitrust enforcement that has lain quiescent since the
conviction of A & P in 1946' on substantially the same charges5 and the
entry of'a consent decree in the subsequent civil suit. The Government's
theory of the antitrust violation of Safeway will be closely scrutinized in
the light of the A & P case bcause no rule of thumb for delimiting legiti-
mate from illegal practices presently exists. The Safeway litigation, there-
fore, may clarify questions raised by A & P both as to the nature of the
illegality of price discrimination and price cutting and as to the theory
and policy behind their proscription. It may settle an area of antitrust en-
forcement about which there has been much controversy for the past ten
years.
The novelty of the A & P prosecution was the application of the
Sherman Act instead of the Robinson-Patman Act to circumscribe the
activities of chain stores. Prior to A & P, the Sherman Act had been used
almost exclusively to attack monopolistic consolidations of manufacturers
which had the power to raise prices and exclude competition. Judged by
these criteria, A & P was theoretically a perfect competitor in that its
integrated operations tended to encourage competition by lowering prices
1 United States v. Safeway Stores, Inc., et al., Cr. 9564, Cr. 9584, Civ. 3173,
CCH Trade Reg. Rep. (Current Ct. Dec.) IP 66,207 (Nov. 1, 1955).
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 United States v. N. Y. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 67 F. Supp. 626
(E. D. IlL. 1946), aff'd, 173 F. 2d 79 (7th Cir. 1949); Civil No. 52-139, S.D.N.Y.,
Sept. 15, 1949; Consent Decree, Jan. 19, 1954.
1. See DIRLAM AND KAHN, FAIR COMPETITION: THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF
ANTITRUST POLICY (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1954), pp. 77-81.
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and passing on the benefits to the consumer.6 Practically, however, the
courts found that A & P abused its integration and, by destructive price
cutting designed to increase its own volume, eliminated competition by
subsidizing below-cost sales with profits accumulated in other phases of
its coordinated operation.
The controversy began with the question of whether A & P should
have been prosecuted at all for these practices; the roots of the problem
lay in considerations of public policy. Chain stores from their inception
were a threat to the small retailer. By the integration of manufacturing,
wholesaling, and retailing activities, they achieved mass buying power
which lowered or eliminated certain standard costs and afforded them
the capacity to cut prices to a level where the ability of the independent
merchant to compete was seriously threatened.
Because of their phenomenal growth in the last three decades, the
large grocery chains have become the target of increased political investi-
gation and legislative attack. In 1929 the United States Senate became
concerned with the monopolistic implications of these vertically and hori-
zontally integrated companies and ordered the Federal Trade Commission
to undertake a comprehensive investigation of both corporate and voluntary
chains to determine the legality of their operations and the adequacy of
the existing legislation. The final report of the Commission, covering all
phases of chain store activity, was completed in 1934; its major dividend
was the Robinson-Patman Act of 1936, the so-called anti-chain store
bill, which amended Section 2 of the Clayton Act of 1914. The original
provision had been designed to prohibit the mediate effects of economically
unjustified price discrimination by large sellers which threatened com-
petition; the amended provision was aimed at the immediate goal of afford-
ing the comer grocer an equality of rights, benefits, and privileges by out-
lawing the preference the chains had enjoyed from special discounts and
bonuses and from secret rebates which they exacted by their unequaled
buying power.7
The Robinson-Patman Act added specific proscriptions. Section 2 (c),
for example, prohibited payments of brokerage or allowances in lieu of
brokerage except for actual services rendered by a legitimate agent in the
consummation of a sale. It had been an easy matter for the chains to get
shippers and producers to acquiesce in the payment of such allowances
to employees, agents, or corporate subsidiaries of the chains. On their
face, such transactions carried the consent of the seller; but, under the
guise of brokerage, they created revenues which directly benefited the
chains and reduced retail prices by a means which independent competitors
could not employ.
To avoid the specific proscriptions of Section 2 (c), A & P switched
6 Fulda, Food Distribution in the United States: the Struggle Between In-
depndents and Chains, 99 U. PA. L. REv. 1051, 1127 (1951).
7 H. R. Rep. No. 627 (Judiciary Committee), 63rd Cong., 2d sess.
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its purchasing activities to so-called "net buying." Its nationally integrated
brokerage offices continued to derive the same price advantages through
purchasing that it had obtained before the passage of the Robinson-Patman
-Act, but now at a price which reflected the savings accruing from not
having to pay brokerage.
A & P interpreted this section as permitting it to receive allowances
which reflected cost savings to its suppliers who were saved brokerage ex-
penses by selling to A & P. The Federal Trade Commission, however,
disagreed,' and the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in sustaining
a cease and desist order, held that all brokerage allowances in any form
were illegal per se, regardless of services rendered in lieu of brokerage. 9
Its maneuverings within the framework of the Robinson-Patman Act
having been curtailed, A & P removed its operations from the sphere of
practices specifically proscribed in the act by shifting its purchasing activities
to sellers who did not use brokers and who could thus legitimately offer
one low price to A & P which did not bear the burden of such a charge.
Since the majority of A & P's suppliers dealt through brokers for sub-
stantial portions of their sales, it was necessary for A & P to induce their
suppliers to abandon purchasing through brokers. In the majority of cases,
suppliers threatened with the loss of A & P's custom, submitted to the
new plan, often at substantial inconvenience and in some cases at signifi-
cant financial sacrifice.
In addition, A & P, Safeway, Kroger and others, attempted to secure
large discounts and advertising allowances from their suppliers, often by
threat of withdrawal of patronage and of entering the manufacturer's own
field of operation. In each case, however, technical compliance with the
requirements of the Robinson-Patman Act resulted in proceedings by the
Department of Justice under the Sherman Antitrust Act. In January,
1943, the Antitrust Division returned indictments against Kroger and
Safeway in the United States District Court in Kansas City, Kansas. Both
were charged, the Attorney General said, with
engaging in various unlawful methods of doing business for the
purpose of injuring or destroying independent competition.
These methods include the obtaining of domination in selected
areas by subsidizing underselling activities which were dis-
continued following the disappearance of independent com-
petition."0
Both companies avoided litigation of the charges and a test of the efficacy
of the Sherman Act as a weapon of antitrust enforcement against price
'4 In the Matter of the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 26 F.T.C. 486, 513
(1938).
t The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. The Federal Trade Commission,
106 F. 2d 667 (3d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U. S. 625 (1940).
10 Statement by Assistant Attorney-General Sonnett, reported in CCH
rrade Reg. Rep. (1948-1951) ff61,113 and ff61,124.
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discrimination, by pleading nolo contendere. Safeway was fined $40,000
and Kroger, $20,000.1
On February 26, 1944, the Antitrust Division filed a criminal in-
formation against A & P in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Illinois on substantially the same charges. On Septem-
ber 16, 1946, Judge Lindley found the defendant guilty as charged and
fined A & P $175,000.12 The conviction was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on February 24, 1949, and the A & P
Company announced that it would not appeal further.1
3
On September 15, 1949, the Attorney General filed a civil action
based upon the criminal conviction in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York, asking for
the complete and perpetual separation of the business of manu-
facturing and processing food and food products now conducted
by the defendants from the business of buying and selling food. 4
The petition also asked for the horizontal and vertical dissolution of
A & P. Final judgment without trial was consented to by 4he Government
and the defendants on January 19, 1954.'"
While these proceedings involved the status of the large corporate
buyer under the Sherman Act, the liability of such a buyer as a recipient
of discriminatory price concessions under Section 2 (f) of the Robinson-
Patman Act was tested in a complaint brought in 1950 by the Federal
Trade Commission against the Automatic Canteen Company.' At the
hearing, the Commission introduced evidence that Automatic received,
and in some instances solicited, prices that it knew were as much as thirty-
three per cent lower than prices granted to other buyers. Automatic moved
to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the Commission, on such a
showing, had not made a prima facie case, but this was denied; and on
Automatic's failure to introduce countervailing evidence, the Commission
entered a cease and desist order.' 7 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit affirmed.'
The Supreme Court, fearing that the opinion of the Federal Trade
Commission was susceptible of the interpretation that every buyer violated
Section 2 (f) if he accepted a discount which the seller could not justify,
reversed. A buyer cannot be required to prove cost saving by the seller,
11 United States v. Safeway Stores, Inc., Cr. 7196, CCH Trade Reg. Rep.
(Supp. 1941-1943) ff52,976; United States v. The Kroger Grocery & Baking Co.,
Cr. 7197, CCH Trade Reg. Rep. (Supp. 1941-1943) 52,976.
12 United States v. N. Y. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 67 F. Supp. 626
(E. D. I1l. 1946).
13 173 F. 2d 79 (7th Cir. 1949).
14 Civil No. 52-139, S.D.N.Y., Sept. 15, 1949.
15 Consent Decree, Jan. 19, 1954.
16In the Matter of Automatic Canteen Co., 46 F.T.C. 861 (1950).
17 Iblid.
Is The Automatic Canteen Co. v. The Federal Trade Commission, 194- F. 2d
433 (7th Cir. 1952).
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the Court said, and a buyer does not violate Section 2 (f) if the low prices
he induces are either within one of the defenses of the seller or are not
known by him not to be within one of these defenses. Proof that the buyer
knew that the price he received was lower than that offered other buyers
was, thus, held insufficient to shift to the buyer the burden of introducing
evidence to show justification.19
The fact that the officers and agents of Automatic were not only
aware that they were getting discriminatory discounts, but that they in-
sisted upon them, underscores the fact that the Supreme Court is still un-
willing to apply a per se test where a legitimate distinction may be drawn
between good faith purchasers and dominant, aggressive buyers. The re-
versal by the Court emphasizes the threatened danger of placing an
arbitrary burden of proof on bona fide purchasers, and limits, as a re-
sult, the effective scope of Section 2 (f) of the Robinson-Patman Act.
Essentially, thus, the prosecution of the Automatic Canteen Company
failed for want of sufficient proof of knowledge of the illegal character
of the alleged preferences. The suit against A & P, on the other hand,
disclosed a plethora of adequate evidence which was introduced on this
point at the trial. In contrast to the lack of success in Automatic Canteen,
therefore, the success of the prosecution of A & P indicates that the ac-
tivities for which A & P was convicted might have been condemned as
well under the Robinson-Patman Act.
The effect of the two decisions when placed in juxtaposition illustrates
a two-fold dilemma for chain stores. Not only must they carefully heed
the specific prohibitions of the Robinson-Patman Act, but they must also
avoid too patent a frustration of these proscriptions or face the threat of
prosecution for violation of the Sherman Act. Avenues of escape which
previously may have existed thus seem to have been foreclosed.
The significance of this novel and hitherto nascent potential of the
Sherman Act justifies a dose scrutiny of the organization and operations
of A & P as well as an evaluation of the basis of its conviction and the
theory behind its prosecution, because in it lies the key to the law and
policy which will determine the outside of the Safeway litigation.
Special emphasis must be placed upon the fact that Safeway is being
prosecuted under both the Sherman and the Robinson-Patman Acts, par-
ticularly in the light of the fact that under Section 1 of the Sherman
Act, as applied in A & P, the shifting of the burden of proof which failed
in Automatic Canteen under Section 2 (f) of Robinson-Patman can be
accomplished.
The effectiveness of the coverage of the price discrimination and
price cutting fronts which can be accomplished by prosecution on this
alternate basis may prove to be a further source of attack by the critics of
the A & P decisions. It has been argued that in and of itself the A & P
19346 U. S. 61 (1953).
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prosecution struck at integration per se and not merely its abuses.2" This is
shocking, if true, because it must then be predicated upon the illegality
of mass distribution in an age of mass production. Therefore, the attacks
in the courts on the activities of chains may be denounced as both misguided
and excessive if they strike directly at the efficiency achieved by chains
through integration, and, to that degree, extend to unprecedented lengths
the protection to be afforded small and independent business, whether
economically efficient in the market place or not.
If, on the other hand, past decisions and decrees indicate an intent
to circumscribe only the abuses of integration-and it will later be shown
that many commentators do not so interpret them-then the result of the
Safeway litigation should be more easily predicted. A reasonable prog-
nostication, therefore, must be based on a close and detailed evaluation
of the A & P case, which, in the light of the Safeway prosecution, affords
a particular insight into this confused area of antitrust enforcement.
THE ORGANIZATION OF A & P
The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company, af the time of the
filing of the criminal information against it in 1944, was a monolithic
organization, vertically and horizontally integrated, comprising twelve
related corporations which did business in seven regional market areas. In
1948, it operated nationally approximately six thousand stores in thirty-
nine states and the District of Columbia; its total sales on the retail level
for the fiscal year ending February 28, 1948, were $2,837,291,185.21
Its two nearest competitors, also operating on a national basis, were Safe-
way Stores, which operated 2103 stores in twenty-three states and the
District of Columbia, with 1948 sales of $1,276,792,822,22 and the
Kroger Company, which operated 2349 stores in a nineteen-state area,
with 1948 sales of $825,668,000.2 Together, the three national chains
sold 15.6 per cent of the national market and 20 per cent of all grocery
and combination store sales; almost one-half of this figure, however,
was controlled by A & p.
2 4
The operating policy and practice of the A & P organization was to
decrease the gross profit rate in the retail stores, along with costs, and
thereby increase the volume of sales. A low profit rate insured low prices
to the consumer and an increased volume of sales to A & P, which drove
down the expense rate by spreading it further, thereby producing perma-
nent and satisfactory net profits. 25
2 0 Adelman, The A & P Case: A Study in 4pplied Economic Theory, 63 Q.J.
EcoN. 238 (1949).
21 MooDY'S INDUSTRIALS, 1949, Vol. 21, No. 13, p. 2753.
2 2 Id. at 2631.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Fulda, Food Distribution in the United States, 99 U. PA. L. REv. 1051,
1125 (1951).
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The implementation of this operational principle required a two-fold
program of cutting margins of profits on the consumer level and cutting
costs on the purchasing level, the latter objective being achieved by obtain-
ing better terms from suppliers than other less integrated competitors
could secure. A & P carried out both phases of this program aggressively.
(i) A & P as a Buyer of Manufactured Products.
By the dual threat either to withdraw their patronage or to enter into
manufacturing for themselves, A & P obtained from its suppliers what
the Government called "systematic discriminatory ... preferences" '20 over
its retail competitors in the purchase of manufactured and processed food
and food products. A & P garnered price discounts and advantages when-
ever the opportunity presented itself and in whatever manner they became
available. The legitimacy of seven of these practices was called into ques-
tion at the trial.
Primarily, A & P sought lower prices at the purchasing level. In this
area, its dual threat was most effective. A & P dealt primarily with small
producers who became dependent upon the volume of A & P's custom
for the economically successful operation of their businesses. Prior to 1939,
for example, A & P took sixty per cent of Ralston-Purina's cornflake
capacity at discounts totaling 72 cents per case. In 1939, it informed
Ralston of the results of a cost survey whereby A & P had discovered that
it could save 21 cents per case by manufacturing cornflakes itself. The
implication was not only obvious, but A & P made it explicit: either Ral-
ston must grant A & P a lower price or it would be forced to enter into
manufacture for itself. After six months of negotiation, Ralston increased
its discount to 17Y2 cents per case, while discounts to other competitors
remained 5 cents per case or less.2 It is notable that similar tactics with
larger producers did not achieve the desired result. Thus, after the failure
of A & P to get substantial price reductions from Crisco and Spry, it ceased
purchasing lard products from either company and commenced its own
manufacture.
2 8
A & P's policy with regard to brokerage discounts has already been
outlined; at the trial, the Government charged that the pressure A & P
brought to bear on its suppliers to abandon sales through brokers was in
restraint of trade and hence a violation of the Sherman Act. Similar
charges were advanced with regard to pressure by A & P to obtain re-
munerative advertising allowances. The practice of granting such allow-
ances is quite customary in the trade, but it was charged that while
A & P insisted upon enjoying the fruits of such contracts, it refused to
be committed to the concomitant responsibility of performance. Thus,
26 Government Brief in the District Court, pp. 221 et seq., United States v.
N. Y. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 67 F. Supp. 626. (E. D. Ill. 1946).
27Transcript of Record, Vol. 28, p. 5701, United States v. N. Y. Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 67 F. Supp. 626 (E. D. Ili. 1946).
28 Ibid.
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A & P was able to avoid the insertion in its advertising contracts of any
specific criteria to which it would be contractually bound. It was admitted
that A & P did an effective advertising job for its suppliers, but its shyness
as to contractual specificity made it impossible for its suppliers to evaluate
the monetary worth of A & P's efforts.
It is not questioned that A & P could, by virtue of the extent of its
advertising activities, offer more advertising to its suppliers at lower cost.
It is nevertheless true that as a result of the lower lineage rates that it
obtained, A & P sold its advertising for far more than it cost and in 1940
alone, on this activity, made a profit of over two million dollars.2"
Further criticism was leveled against so-called "Quantity Discount"
and "Cost Savings" agreements which A & P entered into with its sup-
pliers. The quantity discount agreements, drawn by A & P, denominated
specific discounts which were to accrue to A & P by reason of the volume
of its purchases. A & P, however, never obligated itself to purchase more
than a "large quantity," and frequently, as a result of diversified carload
and less-than-carload lots, the savings granted bore little relation to cost
justifications. 30
The cost savings agreements, also drawn by A & P, committed the
seller to pass along to A & P "the savings in the seller's cost of manu-
facture, sale, and delivery, other than brokerage, in the form of a discount
or allowance ... from the ... regular price." 3 ' In both agreements, the
seller warranted that the discounts and cost savings granted were available
to all other buyers on proportionately equal terms and that they did not
reflect brokerage. The immediate purpose of the draftsmanship of these
contracts was to assure A & P safety from prosecution under the Robinson-
Patman Act by the Federal Trade Commission. The fact that A & P
procured the signing of these contracts by coercion of its suppliers, however,
coupled with the unfortunate proof offered at the trial that in many in-
stances these contracts were sent to suppliers with the discount percentages
already entered by A & P's buying offices, again triggered the charge of
restraint of trade and brought A & P within the proscriptions of the Sher-
man Act.
Finally, certain unrelated occurrences served to reinforce the con-
clusion that A & P was abusing its purchasing power. Thus, A & P was
found to have been able to effect a discontinuance of premium deals and
store-door deliveries to its competitors. 2 It was also able to obtain larger
label allowances than its competitors to compensate for.the higher label cost
which A & P occasioned by using more elaborate labels on the unbranded
goods which it purchased.33
20 Fulda, op. cit. supra note 25, at 1091 n. 163.
30 Appendix A to Defendant's Brief on Appeal, Vol. II, p. 177, United
States v. N. Y. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 173 F. 2d 79 (7th Cir. 1949).
31 Transcript of Record, op. cit. supra note 27, Vol. 12, p. 2773.
32 173 F. 2d at 83.
83 67 F. Supp. at 654.
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Not only was A & P able to secure by these practices manufactured
goods at substantially lower cost than its competitors, but it was also able,
through the collection of the various contractual allowances and discounts,
to aggregate a fund of resources at its headquarters' offices, the use of
which on the retailing level was one of the bases for conviction.
The suspicious nature of these transactions was further heightened
by the secrecy in which they were cloaked. It was, of course, essential both
for the market position of A & P's suppliers as well as for the maintenance
of A & P's price advantage that these preferences be kept as confidential
as possible. But the very element of secrecy requisite to secure its com-
petitive advantage served to reinforce the Government's position that
A & P was knowingly receiving discriminatory and unjustifiable prefer-
ences which placed competitors in a non-competitive position.
(ii) A & P as a Buyer of Fresh Fruits and Produce.
The purchasing of all of A & P's requirements of fresh fruits,
vegetables, and produce was handled by its wholly-owned subsidiary, the
Atlantic Commission Company. ACCO acted both for A & P and for
the outside trade and filled the heterogeneous functions of buyers' broker,
sales broker, and direct buyer for A & P. Seventy-five per cent of its
capacity was directed toward procuring the Company's requirements while
the remaining twenty-five per cent of its activity was with outside pur-
chasers and sellers. Because of the phenomenal completeness of its nation-
wide market information, ACCO was able to purchase at the lowest
possible prices, and because of the volume of its purchases, it was able to
procure the highest possible discounts. Indeed, ACCO was such a valuable
customer on the one hand and such a valuable broker on the other
that it was able to require all purchasers to deal with it exclusively, and
in both situations it was able to collect brokerage, or its equivalent. And
in both situations, the threat of withdrawal of its patronage or its services
was sufficient to insure the payment of its usual fees, even when its facili-
ties were not utilized. 4
The function of ACCO as buying agent for A & P as well as for
the outside trade enabled the organization to dispose of the excess of its
purchases over the requirements of A & P, while at the same time assur-
ing A & P that its produce would always be of top quality and available
when required. The natural result of such a situation was to create not
only a dual quality but also a dual price structure, the latter because A & P
was not required to pay the fees collected by ACCO in its dealings with
the outside trade.'
Further, this inherent price differential was augmented by the pur-
chasing methods of ACCO, which demanded from shippers the cost sav-
ings accruing from "cash" rather than "regular term" purchases and then
secured -rebates when the produce purchased on cash terms did not arrive
34 Government Brief in the District Court, op. cit. fupra note 26, at 24-5.
35 173 F. 2d at 85.
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at destination in U. S. Grade No. 1 condition. Finally, ACCO did all of
its purchasing for A & P on this insured-cash basis, but for the rest of the
trade it purchased only on a regular term basis.3 6
Judge Lindley found the operations of ACCO amounted to a sub-
stantial violation of the Sherman Act, tainting all of A & P's operations,
and upon it he predicated the conviction." While the Court of Appeals
felt that the basis and justification of the prosecution was broader than this,
it nevertheless held ACCO to be a general "conspiracy to establish a two-
price level at the buying level, which enables A & P to meet its competition
with an enormous advantage at the retail level." 3
(iii) A & P as a Seller.
At the retail level, A & P implemented its operating policy of in-
creased volume and proportionately smaller expense rate per item by sell-
ing at marginal gross profit rates. The directors of A & P felt that their
proper retail objective should be twenty-five per cent of the retail sales
of groceries, produce, and food products in every town in the United States
with a population under 400,000, and fifteen per cent @f the sales in all
towns over 400,000. Their retail program was aggressively aimed at the
consummation of this purpose.39
All of the savings accomplished in the manufacturing and purchasing
operations were collected at the headquarters' offices and thereafter allocat-
ed on a tonnage basis to the various retail divisions to support their selling
program. To achieve the desired volume in critical areas, retail units were
allowed to operate constantly at a loss, and while this generally reflected
operations below the cost of doing business it at times indicated operation
below replacement cost. The fact that in some instances, however, sales
were at less than purchase price served as a basis for the Government's
charge that A & P was practicing recoupment of losses by the balancing
of losses in some areas by increased prices in others.4"
Some stores in critical areas operated in the red for more than four
years on this basis. In other areas, short-term losses were suffered so that
particular units could reduce their prices three weeks before a competitor
was about to open near an established A & P store and maintain them at
this low level until three weeks after the projected opening.4 The Com-
pany sought to justify this practice as a bona fide attempt to minimize the
losses in volume that could be anticipated from such openings, but here
again, particular instances of threats by local managers to run competi-
tors out of business were deemed to furnish a reasonable basis for the
36 Fulda, Food Distribution in the United States, 99 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1144
n.405 (1951).
37 67 F. Supp. at 658.
38 173 F. 2d at 87.
39 Transcript of Record, Vol. 68, p. 16,098, United States v. N. Y. Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 67 F. Supp. 626 (E. D. Ill., 1946).
40Id. Vol. 46, pp. 9991-92.
41Id. Vol. 51, pp. 11,438-39.
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inference that A & P's localized price cutting was inspired by predatory
intentions.
42
Further, the practice of sanctioning buying brigades, particularly
in the Southern Division where competition was most severe, to buy out
all items sold by competitors as loss leaders if the price was less than
A & P's replacement cost and then to offer them as a special the next
day at a three per cent mark-up, helped to support the conclusion that
while many stores in direct competition with A & P went out of business
for lack of capital or lack of experience, many others were victims of
A & P's predatory pricing program.
CRITIcIsM OF THE A & P CoNvICTION
The Government contended that this evidence showed an abuse
of combined vertical and horizontal integration on both the purchasing
and retailing levels. It charged that A & P, by illegal methods, coerced
systematic discriminatory buying preferences, with the necessary result
that sellers who granted such illegal discounts and allowances were forced
to recoup their losses by charging A & P's competitors more. 43 Further,
the Government argued that the Company misused the funds obtained
on the purchasing level by supporting predatory pricing in selected areas
through selling below the cost of doing business to eliminate and destroy
competition. The Government argued that this "subsidizing" of par-
ticular units with headquarters', "profits" constituted an unfair and
illegal pricing advantage not open to less integrated competitors who
could not afford to balance losses in one area with gains in another.
The illegality of operation in selected areas so as to undersell and destroy
competitors through the use of buying brigades was an "illegal usurpation
of power over the methods of business employed by competitors and is a
restraint upon trade." 44
The most vocal critic of the A & P conviction charges that integration
itself, and not its abuse, was condemned. This attack is predicated upon
the emphasis which was placed upon the illegality of A & P's practice of
subsidizing local operations with funds aggregated at the headquarters'
offices. "Subsidies" and "integration," it is urged, are but "two names
for the same thing,"14 5 and transfers of earnings from any one stage
of a business operation to any other are merely bookkeeping entries and
not business fact. This argument is buttressed by the fact that A & P's
manufacturing subsidiaries did not sell nor did the regional warehouses
purchase from them in any realistic sense.
It is further argued that the fact that advertising allowances, cost
4 2 d. Vol. 51, pp. 11,574-75.
43 Government Brief in the District Court, p. 1075, United States v. N. Y.
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 67 F. Supp. 626 (E. D. Ill. 1946).
44 id. at 827.
4 5 Adelman, The A & P Case: A Study in .4pplied Economic Theory, 63
Q. J. EcoN. 238, 246 (1949).
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savings, and quantity discounts were aggregated in one office, and then
proportionately allocated, 'does not make them subsidies. This, it is said,
occurred again only from an accounting standpoint because of the legiti-
mate cost savings that could be accomplished by centralized purchasing
and advertising. Hence, it is argued, the charge of below cost selling
relied upon an accounting fiction which does not accurately reflect the
fact that all of these items should apply to reduce the cost of goods sold.
The only possible illegality, it is therefore argued, lay in A & P's account-
ing methods, which, for sound business and accounting reasons, tempor-
arily placed local units in the red and then returned them to the black.46
Finally, according to the critics, the theory of necessary recoupment,
so heavily relied upon by the Government in its theory of the illegality
of A & P's purchasing and retailing methods, is perhaps helpful in the ab-
stract analysis of economic continuums under perfect competition, but to
transfer it from the theoretically abstract to the concretely realistic and
to attempt to apply it as a yardstick of antitrust violation is "inherently
absurd." 4
Specifically, it is argued that most of A & P's retail price differentia-
tion was truly a meeting of competition, and that those units which ran
at a loss for substantial periods did so in an effort to meet the far more
aggressive competition of local chains and supermarkets. Many of the
instances of price cutting, it is said, were made in response to the opening
of new stores by competitors, and since the response to competition, actual
or potential, is an important factor in workable competition, the conviction
cannot stand on this basis alone. 48 It is submitted that this is a valid and
cogent argument, and the Government and the courts are to be criticized
for their failure to disentangle theory from practice and to distinguish
more clearly between instances of "competitive" and "predatory" price
cutting. This failure, however, although unfortunate for a clear under-
standing of the government's theory of the violation, is hardly justification
for a complete condemnation of the conviction. There were numerous
instances of patently predatory price cutting, sufficient to sustain a con-
viction under the Sherman Act, regardless of the failure so to dis-
tinguish.49
Secondly, it is argued that the dual threat of A & P either to with-
draw its patronage or to initiate manufacture itself was not only a valid
by-product of integration but that it improved competition in general by
driving down prices over the entire market."0 A & P's negotiations with
Ralston-Purina are cited in this regard. It must be noted, however, that
46 Ibid.
47 Adelman, Integration and Antitrust Policy, 63 HAav. L. REv. 27, 59 (1949).
4 8 DIRLAM AND KAHN, FAIR COMPETrrIoN: THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF ANTI-
TRUST POLICY (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1954), p. 212.
49 67 F. Supp. at 669 et seq.
G0 Adelman, The A & P Case: A Study in Applied Ecoxomic Theory, 63
Q. J. EcoN. 238, 254 (1949).
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while Ralston did lower its prices, it lowered them disproportionately in
favor of A & P as against other purchasers, and it is significant that the
efforts of A & P were successful only against smaller sellers who had
weakened their market positions by heavy dealings with A & P.51
It is further argued that the criticism of the large advertising allow-
ances granted to A & P ignores the fact that joint advertising with A & P
not only provided the seller with more effective advertising but that it
offered it to him at a price substantially cheaper than he could obtain
for himself. Hence, it is felt, the profit accruing to A & P as a result
of these contracts is merely ancillary and cannot ipso facto be criticized. 52
It is theoretically difficult to dispute this contention when stated
in the abstract. On initial consideration, the benefit which A & P derived
from its advertising contracts seems a legitimate increment of size and
integration. Practically, however, it fails to meet the point in issue.
A & P's advertising contracts were most extraordinary; they promised no
more than "we will advertise."" This indefinite consideration was coupled
with a positive reluctance to be tied down to any specific performance.
At best, therefore, the undertaking contracted for was vague and ill-
defined. Indeed, a vice-president of A & P admitted on the stand that
he was personally opposed to advertising allowances because they were
not offered on an equitable basis, since no yardstick had ever been devised
by the company to measure the performance rendered and to correlate
it with the allowance granted. 4
In the final analysis, therefore, it was not the legitimacy of the
advertising contracts which was criticized nor the existence of profits
resulting from them. It was, rather, the absence of contractual specificity
and the misuse of the funds on the retail level which brought A & P
within the domain of the Sherman Act and thereby precipitated Govern-
ment action.
Finally, it is asked why it is wrong for a firm to do its own buying
and obtain, as a consequence, a more favorable price. In this regard,
the theory has even been advanced that if A & P is not allowed to receive
such discounts, the only possible result must be to enforce systematic
patterns of price discrimination against A & P, which thereby weakens
the full force of competitive pressures on sellers. It is therefore con-
cluded that if the ut.lization of A & P's buying power is not legitimate,
then integration is per se illegal, and if A & P's price cutting is a violation
S51DIRLAM AND KAHN, op. cit. supra note 48, at 235.
5 2 Adelman, The A & P Case: A Study in Applied Economic Theory, 63
Q. J. EcoN. 238, 253 (1949).
53 Government Brief in the District Court, op. cit. supra note 43, at 344;
Appendix B to Defendants' Brief on Appeal, Vol. II, pp. 167-8, United States
v. N. Y. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 173 F. 2d 79 (7th Cir. 1949).
54 Transcript of Record, op. cit. supra note 39, Vol. 88, pp. 20,335-36, 20,342.
5 5 Adelman, The A & P Case: A Study in Applied Economic Theory, 63
Q. J. EcoN. 238, 249 (1949).
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of the antitrust laws, then most price competition, where profit margins
are narrow, is proscribed." Such an analysis is crucial if the conviction
of A & P rests entirely upon the erroneous application of economic theory
by the Government and the courts; it would appear superficial if it avoids
the concrete evidence contained in the record of the unfair use of the
power inherent in A & P's monolithic integration.
EVALUATION OF THE A & P OPINIoNs
A & P was convicted of monopolizing, and, it would appear, properly
so. The courts found in the evidence a consistent course of action and
policy involving abuse of bargaining power and strategic position over
competitors by virtue of size and the geographic dispersion of operations.
Judge Lindley found most of the buying advantages tainted in their
source, being the products of coercive bargaining; he condemned them
as deliberately misused at the retail level by operation on unusually low
and at times economically unjustifiable retail margins in selected areas,
with the specific purpose of "putting the heat on" competitors. That
these findings were sustained by adequate proof there can be little doubt.
But, neither the Government nor the courts consistently differen-
tiated the economically beneficial and the legally reasonable from the
undesirable and unreasonable aspects of A & P's organization and tactics,
and their consequences." The opinions of Judge Lindley, and of Judge
Minton on appeal, demonstrate a tendency to criticize the quest for bar-
gains and discounts, whether justified by cost savings or the performance
of valid functions or not. Both opinions appear to question the legality
of efficient vertical and horizontal integration per se by their failure to
distinguish between the legal and the illegal aspects of ACCO's operation
and of A & P's other subsidiaries.' s They contain, instead, a blanket
disapproval of the "subsidizing" of retail units with headquarters'
"profits." Finally, both opinions reprove any regional discrepancies in
margins without separating the promotional and defensive from the pred-
atory in the industry as a whole.
The exclusion of all of these factors at the trial, on the basis that
they were immaterial, emphasizes the extent of the departure in the
A & P Case from the traditional Sherman Act "rule of reason" which
required a complete examination of the effects and consequences upon
either the entire market or at least a significant part of it. In its stead-
there was applied a new Sherman Act requiring very little in the way
of a configuration of the total market picture except a demonstration
of a course of conduct which in and of itself is characterized as betraying
an intent to monopolize.
At best this failure to distinguish between the permitted and the
proscribed has thoroughly muddled the picture. It has provided the
56 Id. at 251.
5 DIRLAM AND KAHN, oP. cit. supra note 48, at 73.58 d. at 73-8.
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
foundation upon which some critics have denounced the conviction as a
direct attack upon efficient vertical integration while denying other critics
a clear basis upon which to endorse the prosecution as a proper and legiti-
mate control of the abuses of integration. It further tends to blur a
determination of whether the Sherman Act as applied has the potentiality
of superseding the Robinson-Patman Act in this area or whether the
Government and the courts intended only that it reinforce Section 2(f)
by providing for the shift in the burden of proof which had failed in
Adutomatic Canteen.
Finally, the Government and the courts failed to differentiate be-
tween injuries to particular competitors and a monopolistic threat to com-
petition in general. Not only does this seem to frustrate the purpose of
the distinction between the Robinson-Patman and the Sherman Acts,
making, as Judge Lindley suggested, a nullity of the Robinson-Patman
Act, 9 but it has also fostered confusion by leaving buyers in doubt as
to their responsibility under Section 2(f) of the Robinson-Patman Act
on the one hand and under the Sherman Act on the other.60
THE CIVIL SUIT AND THE CONSENT DECREE
As previously noted, on September 15, 1949, the Attorney General
filed a civil suit against A & P in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York. He asked for the complete vertical
and horizontal dissolution of A & P, divestiture of all of its manufac-
turing facilities, elimination and dissolution of the Atlantic Commission
Company and A & P's central buying offices, and severance of the retail-
ing divisions into seven wholly independent companies.61
The proposed dissolution created sharp controversy. Many critics
who had supported the criminal prosecution of A & P as a justified
application of the antitrust laws to control the abuses of integration must
now have reexamined the urgent warnings that the criminal prosecution
of A & P was a direct challenge to the legality of efficient integration.
Dissolution, always a last resort in antitrust enforcement, 62 seemed a
remedy more drastic than the abuses of integration which it sought to
correct, and the proposal encountered violent and widespread criticism. 3
Proponents of the dissolution argued that there would be no public
harm resulting from such a course, because the low-price structure of
A & P's operation could be maintained by carload buying, with the con-
commitant public savings accruing from such purchasing, but without
the opportunity or the possibility of a repetition of A & P's past coercive
59 67 F. Supp. at 676.
60 See DIRLAM AND KAHN, op. cit. supra note 48, at 253-56.
61 CCH Trade Reg. Rep. (1948-1951) f61,226.
62 United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U. S. 417 (1920); Timken
Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U. S. 593 (1951) ; United States v. United
Shoe Machinery Co., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), affd per curiam, 347
U. S. 521 (1954).
63 DIRLAM AND KAHN, op. cit. supra note 48, at 166.
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tactics. Further, they felt that the seven retailing organizations which
would result, each with a projected annual retail volume of $400,000,-
000, would still have the requisite efficiency and buying power without
being under the direct control of a headquarters' office. They predicted
that this would create rather than restrict the dynamicism of A & P's
operations by eliminating the necessity for maintaining a national market
position by defensive, predatory pricing."
Opponents of the proposal, however, asked whether the break-up of
A & P was either a necessary or a proper remedy to effectuate the purpose
of the Sherman Act. It was suggested that an injunction prohibiting
further abuse might be sufficient to restore healthy competition without
the necessity of sacrificing the efficiency of A & P's operation and inte-
gration.
65
The consent decree as entered was more or less a compromise be-
tween these two positions and was much less drastic than the Government's
original proposal. It encompassed twelve points of reformation and con-
trol: (1) A & P was ordered to dissolve ACCO, and any successor to
ACCO was enjoined from selling or dealing with the outside trade; (2)
A & P was enjoined from selling any food to the outside trade except
food manufactured or processed by subsidiaries of A & P or food disposed
of by salvage sale; (3) A & P was enjoined from selling any food manu-
factured by its subsidiaries to the outside trade except at prices no higher
and on terms no less favorable than it sold to itself; (4) A & P was pro-
hibited from acting as buying agent, auction seller, or broker for the
outside trade; (5) A & P was prohibited from dictating systematically
to suppliers to refrain from selling through brokers, to discontinue premium
deals or store-door deliveries or to increase prices to the outside trade;
(6) A & P was prohibited from dictating systematically to suppliers, prices,
terms, or conditions of sale, except at arm's length; (7) A & P was
enjoined from receiving or accepting label allowances in excess of that
offered to the outside trade, even though its costs were greater; (8)
A & P was enjoined from knowingly receiving any discount or allowance
determined on a quantity basis for sales or shipments to more than one
retail unit, except that such prices might reflect the savings on labels for
more than one unit's purchases, and except for carload savings actually
shared by more than one unit; (9) A & P was directed to abandon
the use of its contract forms for quantity discounts and cost savings allow-
ances; (10) Headquarters was enjoined from accepting or aggregating
any payments or allowances; (11) A & P was prohibited from assigning
gross profit rates so as to operate any division at a loss for the purpose
of destroying or eliminating competition; and (12) A & P was ordered
and directed to give the Antitrust Division reasonable access to all its
64Id. at 166-69.
65 Fulda, Food Distribution in the United States, 99 U. PA. L. REv. 1051,
1161-62 (1951).
1956]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
books and to allow the interview of employees to ensure that the decree
was being carried out.
Evaluation and criticism of the decree as finally entered has been
varied. One writer concludes that the multiplicity of directives that
are laid down with regard to the buying and selling activities of A & P
makes the proper enforcement of the decree by the Department of Justice
a practical impossibility. He fears, however, that under the shadow of the
injunction, extending as it does to the minutest detail of its operations,
there is real danger that the decree will turn A & P into a timid com-
petitor and result in putting it at a competitive disadvantage in buying and
selling policies. 6  In direct contrast is the opinion of another critic who
feels that the consent decree accomplishes next to nothing and that it is
padded with meaningless provisions which add up to little more than a
promise by A & P that it will obey the law on price discrimination.
67
But whatever else may be said of the decree, it settled one question
conclusively: all of the prohibitions were dearly aimed at prohibiting
future systematic coercion of lower prices through abuse of buying power
and at prohibiting the misuse of aggregated funds for predatory pricing
tactics. With the possible exception of the eighth and tenth provisions,
as outlined above, which have overtones of limitations on integration pos-
sibly going beyond the mere restaint of abuse, 8 the decree is aimed solely
at the prohibition of future abuse and the dissolution of ACCO.
Direct attack upon chains because of their size or efficiency alone,
therefore, was precluded by the decree. It would be hard to imagine that
A & P would have consented to this decree had they not felt that it em-
bodied mutual recognition that dissolution was unnecessary as well as
excessive. As a result, the decree embodies workable standards of activity
to prevent future abuse which are indicative as the best yardstick to date
for measuring the legality of specific operating practices.
66 DIRLAM AND KAHN, Op. cit. supra note 48, at 169.
67 Adelman, Corporate Integration, How to Comply with the Antitrust Laws,
Antitrust Law Symposium (CCH, New York, 1954), p. 298 n. 28.
6 8 The eighth provision of the Consent Decree, as outlined in the text supra,
restricts quantity discounts and allowances to those based on sales and shipments
to a single retail unit, except as to label allowances and carload savings resulting
from shipments actually shared by more than one unit. In prohibiting A & P from
earning quantity discounts by coordinated buying, the decree goes beyond
protection against the possibility of prospective abuse and prevents A & P from
enjoying what theoretically would be regarded as a legitimate advantage of
integration. It must be remembered, however, that this harsh restriction was per-
haps felt to be justified protection against a repetition of the collection of
quantity discounts, as A & P had done in the past-discounts which were measured
by total purchases or total division purchases and which often did not reflect
actual or justifiable cost savings to the supplier.
Similarly, the tenth provision, in enjoining A & P Headquarters from ac-
cepting or aggregating payments or allowances, also strikes at a prospective abuse
which might have been felt probable in the light of A & P's purchasing history.
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CONCLUSION
The particular lesson to be learned from the success of the prose-
cution of A & P is that any calculated attempt to push to the very limit
of aggressive warfare with small competitors is a dangerous gamble on
the part of a giant enterprise. Since all lines of demarcation are at best
hazy, the consent decree is presently the only reliable guide for the deter-
mination of future controversies such as the pending Safeway litigation.
Certainly, the A & P decisions and the consent decree have indicated
specific prohibited activities. Regardless of dutoatic Canteen, there is
still danger that knowledge of discriminatory pricing will be imputed to
a large, well-integrated buyer. It is dichotomous for a dominant and
aggressive organization to plead ignorance of competitive prices and
sooner or later the Supreme Court will so hold. Therefore, acceptance
of allowances and discounts which cannot be justified on a service, func-
tion, or unit-quantity basis must be considered suspect under present
standards. Further, collection or crediting of brokerage; dictation of costs,
prices, or business practices; the sanction of buying brigades; the insistence
upon or receipt of excessive advertising allowances; and the use of quantity
discount and cost savings agreements, which are unsupported by cost
justification and which shift the responsibility for violation of the anti-
trust laws, are clearly proscribed buying practices.
Similarly, careful consideration of the indeterminate boundaries of
sanctioned activities requires a distinction to be drawn between a con-
tinuing low-price policy under the continuous threat of new entrants
into competition, which is plainly an element of workable competition,
and sporadic destructive price cutting only on specific occasions and in
specific areas in which entrants emerge or threaten to emerge. Thus,
predatory pricing tactics, sales below replacement cost, recoupment of
deficits in one area by raising prices in another, and destructive price
cutting are also prohibited selling practices.
When viewed from this perspective, it would appear that the con-
viction of A & P was proper and was sustained by adequate proof. In so
far as certain language existed in the opinions which tended to create a
danger of the proscription of the benefits of size and integration per se,
it has been precluded by the translation of the conviction on the criminal
charge into specific standards of proscribed practice in the consent decree.
And even if the Government and the courts failed to distinguish between
legal and illegal practices, the chains may feel confident that they will
not be attacked on any other basis than that of abusive price discrimination
and predatory price cutting which tend either to lessen competition or
to create a monopoly in a limited degree. It is hoped that this conclusion
may serve to clarify an area of antitrust enforcement that has caused
more than its due share of confusion. In any event, the particular in-
sights afforded by the A & P decisions and the consent decree should
226 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17
be heeded in evaluating the nature of antitrust violations in this area, and
further developments in the pending Safeway litigation should be awaited
with great interest since they may either confirm or confuse the lessons
which emerge from past prosecutions and convictions.
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